Integrity checking is a crucial issue, as databases change their instance all the time and therefore need to be checked continuously and rapidly. Decades of research have produced a plethora of methods for checking integrity constraints of a database in an incremental manner. However, not much has been said about when to check integrity. In this paper, we study the differences and similarities between checking integrity before an update (a.k.a. pre-test) or after (a.k.a. post-test) in order to assess the respective convenience and properties.
Introduction
Integrity checking has been a perennial topic in almost all database conferences, journals and research labs. Very large quantities of research activities and publications testify to the importance of the issue. The motivation which has stimulated these investigations is that integrity checking is practically unfeasible for significant amounts of stored data without a dedicated approach to optimize the process. Progress has been made with extensions of basic approaches to deductive, object-relational, XML-based, distributed and other kinds of advanced database technology, as surveyed in [66] . However, what has not changed much are the fundamental ideas that are already present in the seminal paper [76] .
The basic idea is that, in most cases, a simplified form of the set of integrity constraints imposed on the database can be obtained from a given update (or just an update schema) and the current state of the database (or just the database schema). Thus, integrity, which is supposed to be an invariant of all possible database states, is checked upon each update request, which in turn becomes effective if the check yields that integrity is not violated. Here, "simplified" essentially means more efficiently evaluated at update time. Of course, efficiency is not unequivocally measurable. However, the number of stored facts to be retrieved for constraint evaluation is a good rule of thumb. Another such rule is the number of literals in the simplified form. Also, the minimization (reduction or avoidance) of repair costs after having detected integrity violation is a factor to be considered when assessing the efficiency of integrity checking. To establish the new state is usually considered less costly than to undo it, but for concurrent transactions, more so in distributed and even more so in replicated databases, establishing the new state is a sizable and non-negligible cost factor (think of the concurrency control, management and communication rounds needed for distribution and different replication strategies), while roll-backs are less of a problem since they can be taken care of and optimized by the DBMS, making use of its transaction logs.
Integrity checking methods may differ in some of the assumptions. For instance, in [76] and in most of the publications on the same subject that came after it, a categorical premise for the correctness of the simplification approach has been that the constraints to be checked for a given update U are supposed to be satisfied in the "old" state, i.e., the database state given when U is requested. This assumption has been relaxed in [69] , thereby introducing the notion of inconsistency-tolerant integrity checking. Other different assumptions may regard the class of integrity constraints and updates that are supported by the methods, as surveyed in [66] .
Unlike previous surveys, in this paper we study the main differences between approaches that require to check integrity after all updates have been applied and those that check integrity before the updates. We shall see that these checks are generally non-interchangeable, unless the updates are of a specific kind.
Preliminaries
In this section, we recapitulate, classify and discuss the main characteristics of the simplification approach to integrity checking. We fix basic definitions and terminology, and thus the framework into which our formalizations in the remainder are cast. In Section 3 we introduce abstract notions of various classes of simplifications and discuss them in Section 4.
Throughout, we refer to the relational framework of deductive databases, i.e., relational databases with possibly recursive view definitions described in clause form [1, 79] . Thus, a database consists of a set of facts and a set of rules, i.e., tuples and views, in the terminology of the relational model.
An integrity constraint expresses a semantic invariant, i.e., a condition supposed to hold in each state of the database. In general, it can be expressed by any closed first-order logic formula in the language of the database on which it is imposed. Two kinds of normal form representations of integrity constraints which both incur no loss of generality are prominent in the literature: prenex normal form and denial form. The former, as defined and used, e.g., in [76, 56] , has all quantifiers moved leftmost and all negation symbols moved innermost, by equivalent rewritings of the original formula. The latter, as defined and used, e.g., in [81, 53] , has the form of datalog clauses with empty head, expressing that, if their condition is satisfied, then integrity is violated, and may need dedicated view definitions to define these conditions by recurring on database facts. An integrity theory is a finite set of integrity constraints, to be thought of as being imposed on some database.
For simplicity, we limit ourselves to databases that have a unique standard model and no "unknown" facts (i.e., each fact is either true or false in the model), e.g., stratified databases, and assume that database semantics is defined by this model.
For a closed formula W , we write D |= W (resp., D |= W ) to indicate that W evaluates to true (resp., false) in D's standard model. For a set of formulas Γ, we write D |= Γ (resp., D |= Γ) to indicate that for every (resp., some) formula W ∈ Γ we have D |= W (resp., D |= W ). If W is an integrity constraint and Γ an integrity theory, it is usual to also say that D satisfies (resp., violates) W and Γ, respectively. An equivalent terminology is defined as follows. Informally, we have already spoken of database states. More formally, database states are determined by atomically executed updates. An update U is a mapping U : D → D, where D is the space of databases as determined by a fixed, sufficiently rich language which need not be extended by any update. For simplicity, we only consider updates that may involve facts and rules in this paper, but no integrity constraints, which are thought of as immutable. For convenience, for any database D, let D U denote the new database obtained by applying update U on D.
Kinds of simplifications
Traditionally, the integrity checking problem asks, given a set of integrity constraints Γ, a database D consistent with Γ, and an update U , whether D U |= Γ holds, i.e., whether the new database is consistent with (i.e., satisfies) the integrity constraints. However, evaluating Γ in D U may be prohibitively expensive. So, a reformulation of the problem is called for, trying to take advantage of the incrementality of updates. Traditionally, all such reformulations have been made under the assumption that the old state is consistent.
We will discuss two kinds of such reformulations that have commonly been dealt with in the literature. Both determine an alternative integrity theory Υ (which by itself is later called a simplification), the evaluation of which is supposed to be simpler than to evaluate Γ, while yielding equivalent results. The first kind of such Υ is determined to be evaluated in the new state.
Definition 3.1 (Post-test) Let Γ be an integrity theory and U an update. An integrity theory Υ is a post-test of Γ for U whenever
Clearly, Γ itself is a post-test of Γ for any update. As indicated, one is interested in producing a post-test that is actually "simpler" to evaluate than the original integrity constraints. This is traditionally achieved by exploiting the fact that the old state D is consistent with Γ, thus avoiding redundant checks of cases that are already known to satisfy integrity. Note that the process of integrity checking involving a post-test consists in: executing the update, checking the post-test and, if it fails to hold, correcting the database by performing a repair action, i.e., a rollback and optionally a modification of the update which won't violate integrity. Well-known post-test-based approaches are described in [76, 57, 46, 77, 55] .
The second kind of approach to deal with integrity checking incrementally is to determine an integrity theory Σ to be evaluated in the old state, i.e., to predict without actually executing the update whether the new, updated state will be consistent with the integrity constraints.
Definition 3.2 (Pre-test)
Let Γ be an integrity theory and U an update. An integrity theory Σ is a pre-test of Γ for U whenever
Here, not only the consistency of the old state D with Γ is exploited, but also that inconsistent states can be prevented without executing the update, and, thus, without ever having to undo a violated new state. The integrity checking process involving a pre-test is therefore: check whether the pre-test holds and, if it does, execute the update. Examples of pre-test-based approaches are [78, 25] . Note that, depending on the requirements of availability and consistency of a given application, integrity checking with pre-tests is possibly better suited for concurrent transaction processing, particularly in distributed databases.
In the remainder, we refer to both post-and pre-tests as simplifications of the original integrity theory. It is tacitly assumed that given simplifications are, at least in significant classes of cases, indeed simpler to evaluate than the original constraints. A characterization of simplicity beyond what is mentioned in the introduction, e.g., by formal cost models, is out of the scope of this paper; cf. [61] for a discussion. Now, whatever the definition of simplicity, we cannot directly compare the evaluation cost of a post-test with that of a pre-test since they refer to two different (viz. old and new) states. Therefore, it is desirable to have kindred reference pre-and post-tests for benchmarking given simplifications. Plain tests, as defined below, i.e., simplifications that do not exploit the fact that the old state satisfies integrity, may serve as such reference tests. Clearly, Γ is a plain post-test of itself for any update. Note that each plain test is also a simplification. For any pre-test (resp., post-test), it is therefore desirable that it be at least as simple to evaluate as the corresponding plain test.
It is straightforward to see that, for fixed Γ and U , all plain pre-tests of Γ for U are logically equivalent.
Proposition 3.4 Let
Conversely, not all plain post-tests are logically equivalent. As a counterexample, take, e.g., Γ = {← p(a)} and let U be the insertion of p(a). Then Υ = false is a post-test of Γ for U but Υ ≡ Γ. We conclude this section with an example of simplification of integrity constraints.
Example 3.1 Consider a database with the relations rev(S, R) (submission S assigned to reviewer R), sub(S, A) (submission S authored by A) and pub(P, A) (publication P authored by A). Assume a policy establishing that no one can review a paper of his/her (former) coauthors. This is expressed by:
Let U be the an update that inserts the facts sub(c, a) and rev(c, b) into the database, where a, b, c are some constants. A simplification of Γ for U (equivalent to what Nicolas' method would output) is as follows:
The simplified conditions given by Σ can be read as follows:
• b did not submit c
• a does not review c
• b is not coauthor of a
• b is not coauthor of an author of c
• c is not reviewed by a coauthor of a These checks are much easier to execute than Γ, as they greatly reduce the space of tuples to be considered by virtue of the instantiation of variables with constants.
Relationship between pre-and post-tests
In this section we compare pre-tests and post-tests and discuss their interchangeability. Note that we do this without referring to any specific simplification method or update language. First, we show that, in general, a pre-test cannot be used as a post-test, nor vice versa.
Example 4.1 Consider the integrity theory Γ = {← p(a) ∧ q(b)} and an update U that exchanges the contents of p and q. Then Σ = {← q(a) ∧ p(b)} is a pre-test but clearly not a correct post-test. Consider, e.g., a database D = {p(a), p(b), q(a)}; we have D |= Γ, D U |= Γ, D U |= Σ, i.e., it does not hold that
This result is not surprising, since we allow for updates representing any kind of transformation of the database, such as swapping the contents of two relations. We now introduce a class of updates that excludes an update such as U of example 4.1.
Idempotent updates capture additions, deletions and changes of specific tuples, which are certainly among the most frequent kinds of updates. For idempotent updates, we can prove that a plain pre-test is also always a valid plain post-test. Proposition 4.2 Let Γ be an integrity theory and U an idempotent update.
Since pre
and thus for any D).
By transitivity between (1) and (2) we obtain the thesis. 2
More surprisingly, however, the converse does not hold, i.e., there are plain post-tests that are not plain pre-tests. In general, even for idempotent updates, there are pre-tests that are not post-tests and post-tests that are not pre-tests.
Proposition 4.3 Let Γ be an integrity theory and U an idempotent update. Then (1) there is a pre-test Σ of Γ for U such that it does not hold that D U |= Σ iff D U |= Γ for any database D consistent with Γ, i.e., Σ is not a posttest of Γ for U . (2) there is a plain post-test Υ of Γ for U such that it does not hold that D |= Υ iff D U |= Γ for any database D consistent with Γ, i.e., Υ is not a pre-test of Γ for U .
Proof
(1) Let D be a state consistent with Γ. We have: 
Another interesting aspect regarding pre-tests and post-tests is whether their evaluation is at all affected by the update. Proposition 4.2 immediately implies that the evaluation of a plain pre-test is not affected by the update, as stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.4 Let Γ be an integrity theory and U an idempotent update. Then
and, by transitivity with the claim of proposition 4.2, we have the thesis. 2
However, this does not hold in general for pre-tests or (plain) post-tests, as demonstrated in the example of the proof of proposition 4.3.
The following table summarizes the results presented in this section. We indicate with Pre U (Γ) (resp., Post U (Γ)) the set of all pre-tests (resp., posttests) of integrity theory Γ for U , and use a 0 subscript to indicate the set of all plain pre-tests (resp., post-tests) of Γ for U .
Related work
Simplification of integrity constraints has been recognized by a large body of research as a powerful technique for optimization of integrity checking. Several approaches to simplification require the update transaction to be performed before the resulting state is checked for consistency with a post-test [76, 56, 81, 46, 29, 55] . As opposed to that, to pre-test the feasibility of an update with respect to an integrity theory allows for avoiding both the execution of the update and, particularly, the restoration of the database state before the update, which may be very costly. Pre-test-based methods are, e.g., [48, 50, 78, 54, 55, 25, 37, 66, 24, 64, 65, 59, 60, 22, 61, 58, 23, 26] , including a few industrial attempts, e.g., [16, 3] . Other methods provide simplifications that may require the availability of both the old and the new state, assuming that the database keeps track of the old state before committing an update, [82, 83] . In [46] , an adaptation of subsumption checking (called partial subsumption) is used to generate simplification as the "difference" (called residual ) between an integrity constraint and a clause representing an update.
Qian's method [78] generates pre-tests for integrity checking based on the observation that a simplified integrity constraint can be regarded as a weakest precondition for having a consistent updated state, in the same sense as in Hoare's logic [49, 41] for imperative languages, and by assuming consistency of the database before the update.
Simplification of integrity constraints for update patterns resembles the notion of program specialization used in partial evaluation, which is the process of creating a specialized version of a given program (in this case, a general integrity checker) with respect to known input data (here, the update), as investigated in [55] .
More generally, integrity checking can be seen as a special case of materialized view maintenance: integrity constraints are defined as views that must always remain empty for the database to be consistent [47, 42] .
Simplification can also be obtained by resorting to decision procedures for query containment [43, 14, 15, 4] , as shown in [25] .
We intentionally did not do so before, but at this point is seems worth mentioning that several simplification methods accept instantiable or parameterizable patterns of updates instead of specific updates, e.g. [48, 46, 25] . Thus, given such a pattern at schema specification time, it is possible to compile a simplification of the integrity theory for all updates matching that pattern. For instance, if constants a, b and c in the update of Example 3.1 were specified as simple placeholders for constants (called dummy constants in [48] and parameters in [25] ), and thus not assumed to be necessarily different, a pre-test-based simplification would also include an integrity constraint that checks that a = b.
Logic programming-based approaches such as [81, 53] do not take into account irrelevant clauses for refuting denial constraints, even if they would take part in an unnoticed case of inconsistency that has not been caused by the checked update but by some earlier event. Moreover, such approaches do not exhibit any explosive behavior as predicted classical logic in the presence of in-consistency. In other words, query evaluation procedures based on SL-resolution can fairly well be called inconsistency-tolerant or "paraconsistent" in a procedural sense, as done, e.g., in [52, 27] . The declarative inconsistency tolerance of simplifications for improving integrity checking has been studied in several works [40, 36, 34, 32, 31, 39, 35, 33, 30, 38] .
The related problem of restoring integrity of a database once inconsistencies are discovered is tackled by calculating a repair, i.e., a consistent database that is as close as possible to the original, inconsistent database. Since the seminal contribution [2] , many authors have studied the problem of providing consistent answers to queries posed to an inconsistent database. These techniques certainly add to inconsistency tolerance in databases, but cannot be directly used to detect inconsistencies for integrity checking purposes (i.e., by posing integrity constraints as queries). Along the same lines, active rules have been considered as a means to restore a consistent database [20, 18, 28] .
Last, we mention work on incomplete databases which also considers integrity constraints that are not satisfied in a given database state as something to be dealt with constructively, instead of banning it from consideration, as most integrity checking methods do [86, 85, 11, 63] . However, that work is not interested in integrity checking simplifications that could be used in such databases. Rather, it is dealing with the issue of satisfiability and its computational complexity, as related to an open world assumption by which the space of possible "closed worlds" (i.e. database states without missing information) that would satisfy integrity are studied. The theme of this paper is to simplify the checking of integrity satisfaction in the presence of inconsistency, not to ask for the satisfiability of integrity constraints in the absence of complete information. (Basic similarities and differences of satisfaction and satisfiability of integrity are addressed in [5] .)
Relevant new directions of research regard all those areas where integrity constraints are used to characterize useful scenarios in which query answering plays an important role. Among these, we mention i) access patterns, which are constraints indicating which attributes of a relation schema are used as input and which ones are used as output [10, 12, 62, 8, 9, 6, 13, 7] , ii) top-K queries, where the constraints specify a limit on the number of results that the query should return, including constraints on proximity or diversity [70, 67, 17, 45, 44, 69, 19, 68, 84, 51] , iii) taxonomies and context information, which may be used to pose constraint on the granularity of the data and to reason about it [75, 73, 74, 71, 72, 80, 21] .
Conclusion
We have discussed and compared the two main abstract families of methods that can be used to incrementally check integrity constraints: pre-tests and post-tests. These are simplifications to be checked before or, respectively, after the update is executed (while update commitment is supposed to occur only after a successful check). In order to not only talk about some selected, specific methods, albeit well-known ones, we have characterized declarative and procedural aspects of simplification-based integrity checking in a manner which is largely independent of concrete methods. Unsurprisingly, pre-tests and posttests are not interchangeable, not only in terms of the convenience of executing the ones or the others in practical situations (pre-tests may actually be preferred in case of updates to be rejected), but also of their semantic properties. Somewhat surprisingly, however, their applicability is mostly asymmetric, even for the simple case of idempotent updates.
